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Abstract: 
Once the alienated economy, China is now well integrated with the rest of the world. The 
country recognizes the growing importance of global economic governance. In fact, it is now 
almost impossible to ensure effective and meaningful global economic governance without 
ensuring China’s active participation. This article critically evaluates Chinese views of global 
economic governance and then tries to ascertain how the country has been participating in the 
process. The article argues that domestic development priorities play very important role in 
shaping China’s global behavior pattern. It further argues that be it in the G20, in multilateral 
financial institutions or in the WTO, China has been following the prudent strategy of 
remaining within the system in order to influence gradual changes in global economic 
governance. It does not want to follow its strategy of alienation any more like it did earlier, 
between the 1950s and late 1970s. 
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1. INTRODUCTION:  
Since the reform and opening up policies of 1978, China’s economy has been growing rapidly. 
According to the IMF, it has already become number 1 in the world in terms of Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) value and is expected to do the same in terms of GDP soon. Once the 
alienated economy, China is now well integrated with the rest of the world and has been 
showing consistent signs of promise in leading the world economy towards achieving a 
sustainable growth pattern. The country followed a carefully articulated gradual reform strategy 
to manage its transition from a command economy to an open market economy. However, its 
economy is still regulated and controlled by state planners to a great extent, especially in some 
key sectors like financial services, energy, telecom etc. ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ 
or ‘Capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ whatever it may be called, there is no doubt that it 
has, so far, worked well for China. In the age of globalization, the country recognizes the 
growing importance of global economic governance and has been doing a great deal to engage 
more extensively with the world economy. China, for the last few decades, has emerged as an 
important part of the global economic governance process. In fact, it is now almost impossible 
to ensure effective and meaningful global economic governance without ensuring China’s 
active participation. This may be because of its growing importance due to its relatively high 
shares in the global GDP, exports, foreign currency reserves, imports and so on. This article 
will at first critically evaluate Chinese views of global economic governance and then try to 
ascertain how the country has been participating in the process and how other leading 
international players like the USA, EU and Japan have been reacting to China’s activism. 
While doing so, it will also take into consideration the country’s domestic development 
priorities shaping its behavior pattern. For the convenience of analyses, its role in the global 
economic governance process will be divided into three parts, a) in the G20, b) in multilateral 
financial institutions, and c) in the WTO. At the end, some concluding remarks will be made. 
2. CHINA’S VIEW OF HARMONIOUS GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE:  
There have been contrasting views regarding global economic governance in China. A section 
of Chinese elites see the current process of global economic governance as nothing but a 
western-dominated mechanism with the main aim of restricting the country’s ability to act 
independently. As a result, they argue in favor of a strategy of isolation (Shield 2013). On the 
other hand, some view it more positively. They recognize the growing importance of global 
economic governance in the wake of an increased level of global interdependence and so call 
for more active participation by China in the global economic governance process (ibid.). At 
present, the supporters of the latter viewpoint seem to have dominance over the policy domain 
of China. 
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Chinese policymakers strongly argue in favor of harmonious global economic governance 
which they have been promoting consistently as an alternative to the prevailing uni-polar 
system. In support of their view, they point to the fact that in the current age of increased 
globalization and interdependence, economic problems are like epidemic diseases that tend to 
transcend national or state boundaries. Therefore, everyone needs to be engaged in order to 
manage a globalized economic system. At least true representation from every corner of the 
world should be ensured to reach a broader level of consensus before making decisions whose 
effects are felt worldwide. This may ensure better compliance and better implementation of the 
decisions at the global level. The overarching logic of reaching a broader consensus involving 
more stakeholders is now more or less recognized by the entire world. Opinion polls conducted 
in 19 countries after the financial crisis of 2008, suggested that majority of the respondents in 
the 17 countries were unhappy with the prevailing global economic governance system and 
supported major reforms in it (Drezner 2014). China is of the opinion that more collective 
action is needed, that more countries from the developing world should be involved in the 
decision making process, and that more representation and democratization is required at 
various levels of global governance forums. Allowing various regional arrangements of 
developed, emerging and least developed countries to play greater roles in the global economic 
forums can help bring about the desired changes (Soesastro 2009).  
China follows a policy of participating in the global economic governance process whilst 
keeping its domestic development priorities and concerns in due consideration. Global concerns 
are always addressed by China in light of its national interests like social stability, economic 
reality etc. The Chinese also insist on following the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Moreover, the country argues against imposing global 
decisions on unwilling or disinterested states.   
3. HOW THE LEADING INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS VIEW CHINA’S 
CURRENT ROLE:            
The leading international powers currently dominating the global economic governance system 
view the critical viewpoint of China mentioned in the earlier section with suspicion, and accuse 
the country of not playing its due role in making the system more effective. China’s current role 
in the global economic governance process is seen as a potential threat to the prevailing 
international order within existing institutions and forums because it apparently challenges the 
status quo. Some countries from the developed world criticize China for not doing enough in 
terms of reforms and liberalization in its domestic arena and thus causing huge trade 
imbalances with the US, EU and other large economies that lead to global imbalances. For 
instance, the USA blames the country for artificially keeping its currency the RMB 
undervalued, ignoring its real value and thus causing gigantic trade deficits for the USA. The 
Chinese surplus and the US deficit are sometimes viewed as mirror images of one another 
inviting political tensions between the two countries (Dervis and Foda 2011). We know that 
China’s surplus is caused by not only favorable transactions in the current account but also 
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movements of capital in the form of FDI. Some of the policy measures taken by the Chinese 
government have been contributing to this favorable situation for the country. In today’s 
globalized economy, policies adopted by a nation state to protect and promote its domestic 
economy often create major problems for other economies of the world. Retaliatory measures 
by the affected states to counteract those policies may be met by further retaliation from the 
first state, complicating the global situation further and further. Therefore, there are strong 
arguments in favor of building an effective global governance mechanism to deal with the 
problems of global imbalances (Frieden 2012). China is criticized by leading international 
players for the poor state of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in the country. They also refer to 
the protectionist policies pursued by the Chinese government in some of the key sectors of its 
economy. China’s close association with some African countries gave rise to concerns about 
the country’s true intention in playing an effective role in the global economic governance.  
4. CHINA’S ROLE IN THE G20:  
The G20 summit is currently viewed as the premium forum for dealing with global economic 
issues. During the Pittsburgh summit of 2009, world leaders upgraded the G20 by replacing its 
earlier version of G7/G8 and subordinating the IMF, the WTO and other institutions setting 
international rules, regulations, and standards (Walter 2011). China has been playing an active 
role since its joining of the forum in 2008. It recognizes the importance of the G20 in 
addressing key economic issues of the world economy and wants to take as much advantage of 
this premier forum as possible to play a more active role in the area of global economic 
governance. It may be noted here that China was very critical of the G7/G8 by calling it ‘the 
rich men’s club’ and questioning its legitimate authority to deal with economic issues at the 
global level. This criticism was mainly due to the exclusion of China from the world forum and 
the lack of representation from emerging and developing economies in it. The G20 has been 
recognized as a well-balanced initiative having equal representation from both the developed 
and emerging economies. Ten industrialized countries from the former G7 plus Australia, 
Russia and the EU Presidency have been combined with ten emerging economies like China, 
India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey in order to form the world’s premium forum for effectively resolving economic issues 
with global implications (Bradford and Linn 2004). China, however, is still critical of the G20 
for its limited focus on the resolution of short-term financial crises only and for failing to adopt 
a longer-term perspective. China has been actively lobbying in favor of utilizing the G20 to 
facilitate the process of building up a sustainable mechanism to deal with economic issues that 
are of global relevance (Shield 2013). The Principal Economist of the Asian Development 
Bank Cyn-Young Park identified four issues for the G20 that have a high level of importance: a) 
the orderly resolution of global imbalances, b) safeguarding financial stability, c) concluding 
the DOHA round of trade negotiations, and d) dealing with income inequality and poverty 
(Park 2011).   
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China has been uncomfortable with the tendency of the USA and some other allied member 
states from the developed world to raise its domestic economic policy issues, like the 
undervalued exchange rate of the RMB, resultant trade imbalances with the USA and other 
large economies, protectionist policies in some key sectors etc., in G20 summits (Shield 2013). 
In this regard, China highlights the importance of domestic considerations and accuses the USA, 
Japan and the UK of maintaining double standards by pointing to the fact that they have also 
been recently following ‘unconventional monetary policies’ (ibid.).          
Perhaps, it is difficult for Chinese policymakers to ignore the reality of China’s export-led 
growth which is largely dependent on the favorable impact of an undervalued RMB. By any 
means, they want to keep protecting their export-led growth for a few more years. The 
protectionist role of the Chinese state has been justified here as a necessity in the interest of the 
continuation of its ongoing trend of growth and development. In this connection, the priority of 
national interest has been overshadowing mounting pressure from the international community 
for a more liberal monetary policy. It may be argued here that China definitely recognizes the 
fact that it can not prolong this kind of protectionist policies forever due to growing pressure 
from the international community. Therefore, as part of a pragmatic strategy, China probably 
wants to buy as much time as possible for its export-based domestic industries till they develop 
some level of resilience to be able to sustain themselves against the challenges posed by 
externalities. The pressure from large economies, especially from the USA, regarding the 
associated trade imbalances is also handled by China by following the same strategy of buying 
time.  
Moreover, the country has been dealing with some of its key sectors with caution and 
proceeding, in terms of reforms and liberalization, at a relatively slower pace despite 
continuous criticisms from the USA and the EU. It is true that China has been making major 
reforms by allowing foreign firms to invest and operate in its once restricted sectors as part of 
the WTO negotiations and agreements. But it was not willing to fully open up these key sectors 
overnight. Instead, it has been maintaining some level of protectionist measures in the form of 
policies related to minimum capital requirements, maximum stake allowed etc. and the 
continuation of state-dominance through the presence of a few mega-sized state-controlled 
firms in these key sectors. China wants to achieve a proper balance in this connection. While 
recognizing the very importance of compliance with the international rules, regulations and 
commitments, it also wants to protect the key sectors of its domestic economy that have 
substantial strategic importance.  
5. CHINA’S ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:  
Despite its critical view of the ‘unequal and undemocratic international order’ prevailing within 
the Bretton Woods system of multilateral financial institutes, China has been engaged with the 
same in order to meet its growing requirement of foreign capital to support its massive 
development programs (Shield 2013). It also aimed to take advantage of the Bretton Woods 
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system, though an unfair system in their view, in order to effectively integrate its alienated 
economy with the rest of the world. The global financial crisis of 2008, originated in the USA 
and Europe, caused a catastrophic global decline in asset value by about US$ 27 trillion which 
was equivalent to almost half of the global economic output (Drezner 2014: 123). The scenario 
has been dramatically changed for China by this crisis and brought the country to the forefront 
of the global economic governance process due to its geo-economic rise and its perceived 
capability to contribute towards stabilizing the global economy (Shield 2013). To the surprise 
of many observers, China suddenly responded to this changed scenario quite responsibly and 
came forward with a contribution of US$ 40 billion for the IMF as capital reinforcement and 
agreed to channel the major portion of its aid and development assistance through existing 
multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF (ibid., pp. 154 and 157). It 
may be mentioned here that the amount of China’s aid and development assistance was more 
than that of the World Bank in 2010. Such an overshadowing of the entire multilateral financial 
system by a single country seriously challenged the effectiveness of the prevailing system. 
However, China accommodated international concerns regarding its unilateral policies on aid 
and development assistance, and agreed to work more closely with the existing multilateral 
financial system for channeling its development assistance to Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean region. China’s commitment of US$ 2 billion to the Inter-American Development 
Bank and active discussions on formation of collaborative funds with the African Development 
Bank and the World Bank were viewed as positive signs of the country’s increasing willingness 
to utilize the existing multilateral financial system.    
China has been consistently raising its voice about the need for reforms in multilateral financial 
institutions. Notably, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) stressed on the need 
for reconsidering the role of US dollar as the global reserve currency in order to move towards 
an alternative mechanism of a multicurrency reserve system (Shield 2013). China also criticizes 
the hierarchical system of dominance whereby only citizens of the USA, the EU and Japan can 
become chiefs of the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB respectively. The credit allocation 
processes of these institutes are often viewed as inappropriate due to their biasness towards 
dominant players of the developed world (Boyce 2004). In this connection, the weighted voting 
system of the Bretton Woods institutes on the basis of respective economic contribution is also 
criticized by most developing countries (UNGS 2011). China has been pressing for an end to 
this undemocratic system of representation and alternatively proposing to introduce a more 
representative system to accommodate all stakeholders’ voices. The World Bank and the IMF 
have been actively considering some important reforms towards achieving a better balance of 
representation in order to keep pace with the changing global scenario. For instance, the recent 
IMF quota adjustments benefited China the most with an increase from 3.72 percent to 6.39 
percent (Madhur 2012: 822).  
It is important to note here that China is not doing this campaign alone. It has consulted and 
successfully coordinated with other major emerging countries, especially from the BRICS and 
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the ASEAN, and together they are following concerted strategies to bring about the desired 
changes in the global economic governance system. Ironically, China has also been playing a 
leading role in creating alternative development banking mechanisms within the frameworks of 
BRICS and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in order to put some level of pressure 
on the existing multilateral financial system. This is the reflection of China’s dual track strategy 
of utilizing the existing system while at the same time pursuing some alternative mechanisms 
too.  
6. CHINA’S ROLE IN THE WTO:  
In 2001, China finally acceded to the WTO after a 15 year-long negotiation process. The WTO 
accession terms compelled the country to undertake major reform initiatives in terms of market 
liberalization, transparency, and international engagement (Singh 2011). It had to accept a 
number of unfavorable and overly strict targets like reducing average tariff to as low as 10%, 
lowering almost all the non-tariff barriers, making major commitments in the service sector etc. 
Some of the provisions were extraordinarily stricter for China compared to other WTO member 
states giving rise to criticisms of treating China unfairly in a multilateral system where every 
state is supposed to be treated on an equal footing (Kennedy 2011). But the Chinese leadership 
took a long-term perspective in this regard and found areas of greater interest in pursuing their 
ongoing reform policies and also a number of factors like enhanced market access to 142 WTO 
member countries, equality of treatment in key markets, further integration into the world 
economy, involvement in rule setting, and potential trade relationships with major trading 
partners (Buckley and Zhou 2013). China’s seriousness about the WTO accession has been 
reflected by the fact that over 3,000 laws and regulations have been either abolished or 
modified or enacted at the central level, and at the local level the same figure has been as high 
as 190,000 (Yi 2011: 2).    
There are major criticisms regarding China’s slow progress in the area of enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). As part of the WTO accession agreements, China has been 
committed to implement IPR and it has done so, at least, in terms of promptly enacting the 
required laws and regulations to international standards. But in terms of the enforcement of IPR, 
China is lagging far behind the expectations of the international community and there are 
widespread infringements of IPR happening throughout the country. Lejeune (2014) identifies 
three reasons for the slow progress of China’s enforcement, namely; a) the lack of political will, 
b) the lack of socio-cultural tradition supportive of IPR, and c) the lack of structural framework 
for the enforcement of IPR laws. Some critics question the sincerity of the Chinese government 
in enforcing IPR. But Lejeune (2014) suggests that China also needs a strong IPR regime in 
order to lift its economy to the upper levels of the value chain by encouraging more indigenous 
innovations. Under severe pressure from the international community, but still keeping 
domestic considerations in mind, Chinese policymakers are probably trying to give some 
breathing space to its domestic industries by slowing the process of IPR enforcement. 
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Another major area of criticism from the developed world is China’s policies of promoting 
indigenous innovation products by using government funds to purchase those products on a 
preferential basis. This is in line with the recently adopted Chinese ambition of transforming its 
manufacturing-based economy into an innovation-based economy by encouraging indigenous 
innovations. In this connection, critics from the developed world accuse China of violating its 
WTO obligations and commitments. Again under international pressure, especially from the 
USA and the EU, Chinese policymakers have committed to make some revisions in the 
country’s Indigenous Innovation Policy measures to comply with the WTO commitments 
(Boumil 2012). This is a reflection of China’s desperation to pursue a strategy of protecting and 
promoting its domestic industries while at the same time accommodating international 
dispositions.   
The commitments made by China under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) paved the way for foreign banks and financial institutions to enter into the once 
restricted financial services sector of the country. It may be noted here that China has been 
undertaking fundamental reforms in the banking sector at the time of its WTO accession 
negotiations. Therefore, despite opening up of the financial services market to international 
competition, foreign banks could make very little impact in the Chinese banking sector. The 
IMF reports that as of the year 2010, less than 2% of China’s banking assets was controlled by 
130 foreign banks (IMF 2011: 21). Foreign banks have been accusing China of adopting 
discriminatory policies barring them from competing on an equal footing with Chinese banks 
and also restricting their attempts to acquire controlling stakes in the existing Chinese banks 
(Crosby 2008). China wants to move slowly in this regard. International players like the USA 
and Japan question the legitimacy of China’s restrictions on foreign equity participation in 
existing Chinese banks of up to 20-25% and see it as a violation of its WTO commitments 
under GATS. On the other hand, China argues that foreign equity participation in existing 
Chinese banks should be beyond its WTO commitments (ibid.).          
7. CONCLUSION:  
From the above analyses, it is evident that China has been, in recent times, following a strategy 
of being actively engaged with the prevailing global economic governance system in order to 
reap the benefits from the existing system. At the same time, it has been also pressing for 
reforms in order to mainly fix the issue of the ‘balance of influence’ by creating pressures from 
both inside and outside the system. Although some view the necessity of a USA-China centered 
G2 system as a pre-requisite for a more effective G20, China does not explicitly accept the idea 
of a narrower G2 (Walter 2011). This may be due to a potential conflict of position with its 
ongoing campaign for a harmonious global economic governance system. It may be argued that 
since the 1980s, China’s position in the process of global economic governance has never been 
very rigid. To sum it up, four salient features can be labeled on China’s current role in the 
process. Firstly, the country has been making a considerable amount of concessions amidst 
international pressures wherever it has been considered to be absolutely necessary. Secondly, 
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China takes its domestic concerns into serious consideration while engaging with the global 
economic governance process and consistently shows the tendency of trying to buy time for 
domestic situations to reach a certain level of maturity and sustainability. Thirdly, China has 
been gradually assuming a more pro-active role in global economic governance without 
seriously damaging the existing system. Finally, China has been building a strong support base 
from the emerging and developing countries at regional and global levels to create effective 
pressures on the current dominant players in the area of global economic governance. After the 
financial crisis of 2008, China’s campaign for a more harmonious and inclusive global 
governance gained a better ground and even policymakers from developed countries started to 
look at China’s viewpoint more positively. They have been able to recognize the growing 
importance of incorporating China and other major emerging economies like India, Brazil and 
South Africa for achieving an effective global economic governance system. Here, possibly, 
lies the success of China’s continuous efforts in favor of a harmonious system that it has been 
promoting for decades. Be it in the G20, in multilateral financial institutions or in the WTO, 
China has been following the prudent strategy of remaining within the system in order to 
influence gradual changes in global economic governance. It does not want to follow its 
strategy of alienation any more like it did earlier, between the 1950s and late 1970s. 
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